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World Trade & U.S. Jobs 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] It has become obvious to everyone in and around the U.S. labor movement that our problems 
involve the global arena. Hundreds of thousands of trade unionists have seen their employers shut down 
plants and shift production overseas. Countless union negotiators have seen the boss play the foreign 
card at contract time: "You have to give concessions to meet the foreign competition." 
U.S. trade unionists are a diverse lot, and they have come up with numerous interpretations of the 
international challenge. But, in practice, the primary way the U.S. labor movement has responded to the 
internationalization of labor relations has been to push for protective legislation against the unfair trading 
practices of foreign nations. 
This article takes a different tack. While it is true that unfair trading practices have deepened America's 
economic problems, our trade deficit is itself a symptom of a deeper problem — global economic 
stagnation — that afflicts not only American workers but workers all around the world. 
The world economic situation now resembles that of the 1930s, when farmers dumped surplus food on 
the highways and factories lay idle because ordinary working Americans could not afford to buy what they 
produced. Today this crisis of underconsumption has returned — but on a global scale. 
As long as the world's workers can't afford to buy what they produce, competition for markets will remain 
feverish, trade wars will spur demands for protectionism, and workers will continue to find themselves 
under severe pressure to restrain their wage demands. The restoration of "fair trade" is desirable, but in 
itself it is no solution to the fundamental crisis of underconsumption caused by workers' lagging 
spending power. 
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It has become obvious to everyone in and around the U.S. labor 
movement that our problems involve the global arena. Hundreds 
of thousands of trade unionists have seen their employers shut 
down plants and shift production overseas. Countless union 
negotiators have seen the boss play the foreign card at contract 
time: "You have to give concessions to meet the foreign compe-
tition." 
U.S. trade unionists are a diverse lot, and they have come up 
with numerous interpretations of the international challenge. But, 
in practice, the primary way the U.S. labor movement has 
responded to the internationalization of labor relations has been 
to push for protective legislation against the unfair trading 
practices of foreign nations. 
This article takes a different tack. While it is true that unfair 
trading practices have deepened America's economic problems, 
our trade deficit is itself a symptom of a deeper problem—global 
economic stagnation—that afflicts not only American workers but 
workers all around the world. 
The world economic situation now resembles that of the 1930s, 
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when farmers dumped surplus food on the highways and factories 
lay idle because ordinary working Americans could not afford to 
buy what they produced. Today this crisis of underconsumption 
has returned—but on a global scale. 
As long as the world's workers can't afford to buy what they 
produce, competition for markets will remain feverish, trade wars 
will spur demands for protectionism, and workers will continue 
to find themselves under severe pressure to restrain their wage 
demands. The restoration of "fair trade" is desirable, but in itself 
it is no solution to the fundamental crisis of underconsumption 
caused by workers' lagging spending power. 
The Limits of Trade Protection 
Over the last 20 years, American unions have shifted from being 
the most free-trade oriented labor movement in the world, to being 
strongly protectionist. While many labor proposals for trade 
legislation to save U.S. jobs have been defeated, successive 
administrations have adopted such measures as the Multi-Fiber 
Agreement that limits textile and garment imports, Voluntary 
Restraint Agreements in the steel and auto industries, and worker 
rights provisions in a number of trade laws. 
U.S. labor's swing to protectionism is justified as a form of self-
defense: America's leading trade partners have adopted far more 
protectionist policies than has our own government. As Table I 
indicates, more than half of the U.S. trade deficit resulted from 
trade imbalances between the U.S. and Western Europe (17% of 
the U.S. deficit) and the U.S. and Japan (36% of the deficit). Western 
Europe has tightly limited significant parts of its market ever since 
World War II, in order to protect key industries such as auto, steel, 
and computers. Most European countries have all but prohibited 
imports of automobiles from outside the continent, for example. 
One result has been that Ford and General Motors have had 
to build plants in Europe for sales on the continent, rather than 
exporting American-built cars from factories that employ U.S. 
workers. A second result is that the Japanese, finding themselves 
barred from exporting to Western Europe, have targetted the great 
bulk of their auto exports to the United States. Today Japanese 
auto manufacturers make more of their profits in the U.S. than 
in Japan or anywhere else in the world. 
Japan has gone to even greater lengths than Western Europe to 
close its domestic market. In agriculture, for example, despite the 
fact that Japanese farmers are high-cost producers, the government 
keeps most food imports out of the country. When it comes to 
i 
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1 Table 1 ~ ^ ^ H 
Composition 
(1987, 
Advanced Industrial 
Countries (AlCs) 
Japan 
W. Europe 
Other AlCs 
Newly Industrialized 
Countries (NICs) 
Taiwan 
S. Korea 
Hong Kong 
Mexico 
Brazil 
Singapore 
All Other Countries 
TOTALS 
of U.S. Itade Deficit 
in billions of dollars) 
Imports 
From 
$259 
85 
96 
78 
$86 
25 
17 
10 
20 
8 
6 
$64 
$409 
Exports 
To 
$166 
28 
69 
69 
$42 
7 
8 
4 
15 
4 
4 
$44 
$252 
Trade 
Deficit 
$93 
57 
27 
9 
$44 
18 
9 
6 
5 
4 
2 
$20 
$157 
% of 
Deficit 
59.2% 
36.3% 
17.20/0 
5.7% 
28.0% 
11.5% 
5.7% 
3.8% 
3.2% 
2.5% 
1.3% 
12.8% 
100% 
manufactured goods, Japan flouts the international free trade 
agreements (GATT) to which it has long been a party. Because 
Japanese companies are members of large industrial blocs, which 
tie together financial services, suppliers, manufacturers, and 
trading companies, firms like Toyota and Sony prefer to buy their 
supplies from allied companies, rather than from abroad. Their 
bias against imports is encouraged by MITI, the Japanese trade 
ministry, which targets industries whose growth and prosperity 
are deemed essential to the nation's economic vitality. Targetted 
industries, such as semiconductor manufacturing in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, where U.S. firms like Texas Instruments and Intel 
once had a big lead, are provided cheap capital, protection against 
imports, and subsidies for exports. With such help, they soon 
become world leaders. 
At the same time that Western Europe and Japan restrict access 
to their home markets, transnational corporations, mostly based 
in the U.S., Western Europe and Japan, and funded by transnational 
financial institutions, have established myriad manufacturing 
plants in low-wage Third World countries. Because Western 
Europe and Japan restrict access to their markets, the bulk of these 
Third World exports go to the United States. As Table I indicates, 
in 1987 American imports from six newly industrialized countries 
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(NICs)—Mexico, Brazil, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and 
Singapore—totalled $86 billion and accounted for 28% of our trade 
deficit. 
In short, the U.S. has become a dumping ground for goods that 
cannot be sold anywhere else. American industrial workers have 
turned to protectionism in self-defense. But while labor's protec-
tionist stance is justified, it does not and cannot work very well 
in the long run for two reasons. 
First, a powerful array of domestic interest groups oppose the 
extension of protective trade legislation. Transnational manufac-
turing, trading and financial corporations, eager to expand their 
overseas operations, are a potent Washington lobby. American 
farmers, desperate to increase their exports, oppose restrictions 
on manufacturing imports for fear of retaliation from our trading 
partners. Millions of American workers in the service sector who 
process, distribute, and retail imports have no interest in restricting 
the trade on which their jobs depend. Millions more workers in 
export-oriented industries, like computer manufacturing, arms 
production, pharmaceuticals and chemicals, do not share the goals 
of those endangered by unchecked imports. Finally, those who 
think of themselves more as consumers than as workers oppose 
trade legislation that might raise prices. The power of this coalition 
of interests is reflected in the fact that protectionist trade legislation 
has been passed only piecemeal, and our nation's trade negotiators 
have repeatedly bargained away the jobs of workers imperilled 
by other nations' trade practices. 
Labor's protectionist stance confronts a second problem as well: 
it jeopardizes efforts to achieve international labor solidarity. If 
American workers constantly push to keep out products from 
Brazil, France, Sweden or Korea, how will they ever be able to 
join with workers around the world in common struggle against 
transnational corporations which as a matter of conscious policy 
attempt to play one nation's labor force against another's? If we 
exclude Korean automobiles from American markets, how can we 
make common cause with the Daewoo auto workers whose plants 
are 50% owned by General Motors? 
The Root Problem: Slow Worldwide Growth 
A third weakness of protectionism as a solution for America's 
job and income crisis is that it treats unfair trade practices as the 
cause of our problems, instead of seeing those practices as a 
symptom of a deeper problem—slow worldwide growth. Over the 
last 15 years, one nation after another has erected trade barriers 
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around their own borders, while at the same time promoting 
export-oriented production. The cause of the resurgence of protec-
tionism worldwide is that over this same 15-year period, economic 
growth around the globe has slowed dramatically. While economic 
growth approached 5% annually over the years 1948-73, it has 
averaged half that in the last decade and a half (see Figure I). 
While the demand for industrial goods stagnated, worldwide 
industrial capacity expanded. Transnational corporations built 
new facilities in low-wage regions in an effort to maintain their 
profitability. Many Third World nations created export-oriented 
industries subsidized by international lending agencies, in a 
desperate effort to gain foreign exchange needed to pay for rising 
energy costs. 
The combination of stagnant consumption and expanding 
productive capacity created a crisis of underconsumption: 
Workers' spending power was too small to buy what they could 
produce. This crisis forced down the wages of workers all over 
the world, triggered the liquidation of thousands of factories in 
the United States and Europe, and stimulated an intense global 
trade war. 
The Global Debt Crisis 
A major cause of global stagnation has been the debt crisis. In 
the late 1970s, when the industrial nations decided to slow down 
the growth of their money supplies and to increase interest rates 
in order to slay the inflationary dragon, the interest rate hikes 
pushed much of the Third World near to bankruptcy. In many 
"developing countries," including most of Africa, Central America 
and the Caribbean, economic growth has come to a virtual halt 
as international sources of capital to fund new investment have 
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closed their doors. As a result, these regions have been unable 
to increase their imports of manufactured goods from the U.S., 
Western Europe and Japan. American workers once manufactured 
tractors and earth movers for use in road-building projects in 
Liberia, Jamaica, or Guatemala; today, such projects have been 
cancelled, and the factories that produced those tractors are shut 
down. 
A few Third World countries—Mexico, Brazil, and the Philippines, 
for example—were encouraged by the principal international 
lending agencies, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank, to solve their debt crises by building up export 
industries. But the loans that financed this growth had strings 
attached: the developing countries had to impose austerity on their 
populations. Increased export earnings in these countries have not 
gone to increase workers' spending power and thus develop the 
local economy—they've gone to repay the banks. 
In the 1980s, total exports of American manufactured goods to 
Latin America actually decreased by 5%. This is a remarkable 
figure considering that the export-oriented plants being built in 
some Latin American countries were substantially increasing their 
purchases of American machinery in order to boost capacity. 
Clearly, Latin American imports of consumer goods fell drastically. 
Or to put it simply, under the austerity programs imposed by the 
IMF and World Bank, Brazilian workers who make shoes for sale 
in the United States can't afford American refrigerators or washing 
machines. 
Continuing Poverty in the NICs 
The trade imbalances caused by the debt crisis were made worse 
by the second cause of the global crisis of underconsumption— 
the promotion by transnational corporations of duty free zones 
in the newly industrialized countries (NICs). In these enclaves, 
workers are paid extremely low wages to manufacture goods 
(which they cannot afford to buy) for export to the rich nations. 
Over the past 15 years, European, Japanese and American trans-
nationals have worked closely with local governmental authorities 
to establish export-oriented manufacturing industries on the 
Pacific Rim—Taiwan, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Hong Kong, the 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand—as well as in the Caribbean, 
Latin America and Africa. In addition, transnational banks have 
financed thousands of locally-owned firms to set themselves up 
in the export business. 
Initially these export-oriented factories were sweatshops, using 
obsolete technology to produce low-quality, low-priced merchan-
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dise that was profitable only because of the abysmally low wages 
paid to workers. Over time this has changed; now modern 
manufacturing plants employ the latest technology, and computers 
link the central offices of Japanese, European and American firms 
to production lines in Kuala Lampur, Taipei, Sao Paolo, Tunis and 
the Mexican border cities. 
Cheap labor, low taxes, and freedom from environmental and 
other regulations are the main attractions these export enclaves 
hold for transnational corporations. Manufacturing processes ruled 
too unhealthy for American workers are routinely carried out by 
teenagers in Taiwan and Mexico. On July 2, 1988, in Seoul, South 
Korea, Moon Song Myun died at age 14 from mercury poisoning 
he contracted in an instrument manfuacturing plant. Three 
months earlier, the Labor Ministry had refused him industrial 
disease-related medical assistance. He was one of at least 142,000 
Korean workers who were killed or seriously injured by industrial 
accidents last year. Indeed, more than 2% of Korea's workforce 
is seriously injured or killed in industrial accidents every year. 
The hunger of Third World governments for foreign investment 
causes them to offer extraordinarily sweet tax deals to the trans-
nationals. But low wages remain the largest inducement to trans-
national investment in the export enclaves. While manufacturing 
workers in the U.S. earn more than $10 an hour on average, in 
Korea the corresponding figure is $1.43. Although one might 
expect the local governments to push the transnational to raise 
wages in order to boost their domestic purchasing power, the 
reverse is true. Bayonets and prisons keep labor cheap and trans-
nationals coming back for more. Taiwan, the newly industrialized 
country in which wages have risen most, doubling over the past 
four years, has lost hundreds of plants to the lower-wage compe-
tition of Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia. 
The Austerity Agenda at Home 
The third cause of the crisis of insufficient worker spending 
power lies closer to home. For the last 20 years, the U. S. and 
Western Europe have battled inflation by imposing austerity on 
their domestic economies. Ever since President Nixon engineered 
his first recession in 1969, the world's richest nations have been 
sacrificing economic growth in order to kill the spectre of rapid 
inflation. As a result, the West's unemployment rate in the years 
1970-88 has been more than twice the level of the years 1948-68, 
while the growth of gross national products has declined by more 
than half. 
In the years 1979-83, when austerity politics was at its fiercest, 
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the Western governments attempted to limit the growth of their 
domestic money supplies in the expectation that this would 
produce low inflation and slow but steady economic growth. This 
policy, called monetarism, produced unprecedentedly high real 
interest rates (the difference between the interest rate and 
inflation), which crippled not only the housing industry and auto 
sales, but also the debtor nations of the Third World. Twice, in 
1979 and 1981, high interest rates plunged the world into steep 
depression. And real interest rates remain at record-high levels. 
In early 1989, real interest rates were 5%, higher than in any year 
from 1930 to 1979. These high rates choke off productive invest-
ment, burden Third World debtor nations with unmanageable 
interest payments, and stimulate the speculative financial excesses 
that dominate the business pages of newspapers in New York, 
London, Tokyo, Paris and Bonn. 
A Labor Program: 
Raising Workers' Spending Power Worldwide 
According to the conventional wisdom, American workers are 
losing jobs and spending power because American industries have 
become uncompetitive in global markets. The remedy, this argu-
ment goes, is for workers to cooperate with corporate leaders 
through wage restraint and the relaxation of work rules. The 
upshot of this argument is that we can become more "com-
petitive" only by reducing our living and working standards. But 
if the problem is not "competitiveness" but global underconsump-
tion, then this conventional program will just make matters worse. 
And if the global crisis of underconsumption is caused primarily 
by poverty in the Third World, the growth of low-wage export 
enclaves in the newly industrialized countries and austerity 
politics in the developed nations, then any solution to the crisis 
will have to address all three problems. The American labor move-
ment has a vital interest in pushing for such a solution. 
Defusing the Debt Crisis 
In order to defuse the Third World debt crisis so that workers 
in the developing nations will be able to improve their living 
standards, three steps are vital. First, the international lending 
agencies must stop playing the role of the Grinch who stole 
Christmas. Not only are the IMF and the World Bank providing 
too few loans to the debtor nations, they are enforcing poverty 
wages on their workers. The developed countries and the wealthy 
OPEC nations should expand their funding of the IMF and the 
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World Bank, so that they can expand their lending. Even more 
important, these international agencies should be forced to 
abandon their austerity agenda so that workers' spending power 
can increase as economic growth quickens. 
Second, a World Development Fund should be established to 
buy from international banks the Third World's existing private 
debt. Since these loans cannot be repaid under their current terms, 
the banks should be paid less than their full face value. The World 
Development Fund could then reschedule the debt at lower 
interest rates and over longer terms. 
The Third World debt crisis is so large, however, that these two 
measures, by themselves, would fall short of enabling the debtor 
nations to resume economic growth and restore their workers' 
spending power. To solve the crisis, we need a new Marshall Plan, 
this one aimed at the Third World. Currently, the world's rich 
countries are not even meeting the foreign aid targets they agreed 
to in the 1970s. While the developed countries agreed to raise their 
aid levels to .7% of their GNPs, many remain far below that 
standard; in 1981, the UK was lending .44% of GNP, Japan .28%, 
and the U.S. only .2%. 
If the rich countries agreed to a new Marshall Plan, they could 
channel their aid through the World Development Fund to support 
development projects aimed at stabilizing depressed agricultural 
regions, improving infrastructure, and building up domestically-
oriented manufacturing industries. 
These proposals may seem like pipedreams to Americans who 
have heard little serious discussion about how to defuse a debt 
bomb that could explode at any moment. But in Western Europe, 
Fiaure II 
Manufacturing Wages In Dollars Per Hour 
(1987, converted by the exchange rate) 
Mexico $ .97 I 
Brazil 1.10 • 
Korea 1.43 • 
Hong Kong 2.04 • • • 
Taiwan 2.12 WKM 
United Kingdom 7.69 
France 8.64 
Japan 9.92 
Sweden 10.57 
United States 10.82 
West Germany 13.16 
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there has been serious discussion of similar proposals from a 
prestigious international commission headed by former German 
Chancellor Willy Brandt in 1983. Although these proposals were 
favorably received by many European labor parties, they were 
all but ignored in Reagan-era America. 
Solidarity with Third World Workers 
Defusing the debt crisis might enable Brazil and Mexico to 
resume internal development and boost workers' spending power, 
but it would have little impact on many other export-oriented 
newly industrialized countries. In Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, 
Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia, repressive regimes 
depend on U.S. aid to impose austerity on their impoverished 
masses. If the American labor movement were to oppose 
American aid to these allied governments unless they allow their 
workers to organize effective labor unions, we could help them 
to raise their wages so that they could afford to buy the goods 
they produce, as well as some of our own products. 
Second, as Matt Witt points out in another article in this issue, 
American trade law already contains provisions that call for 
sanctions against trading partners that violate internationally 
recognized labor rights. If American unions press for stronger 
enforcement of these provisions, we can add our weight in support 
of the efforts of Third World workers to increase their spending 
power. 
Third, American labor can press for legislation that would make 
it less profitable for U.S.-based transnational to invest in export 
enclaves. Favorable tax treatment for profits earned overseas 
should be eliminated as should federal insurance programs for 
foreign investment in countries with authoritarian regimes. 
Toward a Global Growth Policy 
Finally, American labor must challenge the austerity politics that 
has prevailed in the developed world for more than a decade. 
Today, conventional wisdom holds that taxes must be raised and 
imports curtailed in order to bring the American budget and trade 
deficits in line. This is a recipe for global disaster, since large-scale 
reductions in American purchases of foreign products could 
plunge Third World debtor nations into bankruptcy, while stifling 
the Western European and Japanese economies as well. 
There is an alternative to austerity politics: the U.S. could grow 
its way out of its budget and trade deficits. One important step 
towards renewed growth would be reducing interest rates in order 
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to stimulate productive investment at home, reduce the domestic 
budget deficit, and ease the Third World debt crisis. Thus, the 
U.S. could solve the problem posed by its huge trade deficit by 
boosting its exports rather than by cutting imports and reducing 
living standards. 
These steps toward renewed growth require greater coordi-
nation between U.S. and foreign policymakers. The Federal 
Reserve could only reduce U.S. interest rates if Western Euro-
pean and Japanese central bankers agreed to reduce their own 
rates. And we could step up our exports without cutting imports 
only if Western Europe and Japan agree to pursue their own 
growth policies, while at the same time renewed Third World 
growth provided additional markets for American goods. Clear-
ly, pursuing worldwide growth rather than austerity will require 
greater international economic coordination than currently exists. 
The labor movements in all of the advanced countries should take 
the lead in fostering this coordination for a growth agenda. 
Conclusion 
The problems confronting U.S. industrial workers point to the 
need for American labor to adopt a trade policy that can win it 
allies at home and abroad. Such a policy would have to assure 
Americans that promoting jobs for industrial workers threatened 
by imports would not come at the expense of farmers, consumers, 
and employees of export-oriented firms. And it would have to 
reassure workers outside the United States that it is possible to 
promote job growth in the U.S. and abroad as well. 
Does a policy favorable to workers both at home and abroad 
sound too good to be true? If it does, that may be a measure of 
how corrupting eight years of the political discourse of 
Reaganomics has been for all of us. If the world's nations abandon 
their beggar-thy-neighbor policies and adopt instead a coordinated 
growth policy, all the foreign exporters who have been targetting 
the U.S. as their dumping ground would soon find alternative 
markets. Domestic exporters would enjoy growing markets as 
well. The squeeze on American industrial workers would finally 
relax. 
Adoption of a global growth policy not only makes political 
sense, it addresses the real causes of our problems. The stagnation 
in American workers' living standards is inseparable from the 
stagnation of living standards of workers all around the wCxld. 
Raising our standard of living now requires that we work in 
solidarity with workers everywhere. • 
